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An elementary derivation of best eavesdropping strategies
for the 4 state BB84 quantum cryptography protocol is pre-
sented, for both incoherent and two–qubit coherent attacks.
While coherent attacks do not help Eve to obtain more infor-
mation, they are more powerful to reveal the whole message
sent by Alice. Our results are based on symmetric eaves-
dropping strategies, which we show to be sufficient to analyze
these kind of problems.
PACS Nos. 03.65.Bz
In the 4-state BB84 quantum cryptography protocol
[1], Alice, the transmitter, sends qubits in states cho-
sen at random among a set of 4 possible states S =
{|0〉z, |1〉z, |0〉x, |1〉x}, where the subscripts z and x de-
note the polarization axis. At the other end of the quan-
tum channel Bob, the receiver, analyzes the qubits in a
basis chosen at random between {|0〉z, |1〉z} (z basis) and
{|0〉x, |1〉x} (x basis). When Bob’s basis happens to be
compatible with the state sent by Alice, the only cases
that the two partners will consider after publicly reveal-
ing the basis used for each qubit, Bob’s results are per-
fectly correlated to the states sent by Alice. The safety
of this protocol relies on the control of this perfect corre-
lation and on the quantum principle that any eavesdrop-
ping necessarily perturbs the state of some of the qubits,
hence reducing this correlation. Alice and Bob measure
this correlation by publicly comparing a sample of their
data. However, there is a practical question: given a
measured correlation, how much information could have
been collected by a malevolent third party, called tradi-
tionally Eve?
The general eavesdropping attack consists of first let-
ting an auxiliary quantum system, called the probe, in-
teract with the message (in form of qubits) sent by Alice
[2]. Then, Eve waits until she knows the basis used in
Bob’s measurements, and extracts as much information
as possible out of her probe. Thus, a given eavesdropping
strategy can be characterized by a pair (U ,M), where U
is the unitary transformation used in the interaction be-
tween Eve’s probe and the message, and M represents
Eve’s measurement. Most of the analysis of the best
eavesdropping strategy so far have been concentrated in
the so–called “incoherent attacks”, in which each of Eve’s
probes interacts independently with each qubit sent by
Alice. However, there might exist a better strategy for
Eve in which her probes interact with more than one of
Alice’s qubits at the same time, what is known as “coher-
ent attacks”. This letter provides an elementary deriva-
tion of the optimal eavesdropping strategy for a given
disturbance of the perfect correlation between Alice and
Bob’s data for both incoherent attacks and coherent at-
tacks on two qubits. Our results show that coherent at-
tacks do not help Eve to obtain more information about
Alice message. However, they allow Eve to obtain the
whole message sent by Alice with a higher probability.
Thus, this is a situation where coherent attacks prove to
be more powerful than incoherent (single qubit) ones [3]
even if no error correction or privacy amplification [4] is
performed.
Our formulation of the problem is based on what we
will call “symmetric eavesdropping strategies”. Those
are attacks in which Eve treats all the possible messages
sent by Alice on an equal footing. As we show below,
without loss of generality, one can restrict oneself to an-
alyze symmetric eavesdropping strategies only, which re-
duces enormously the problem. The reason is that for
any given non–symmetric attack, coherent or incoherent,
one can always find a symmetric one that reproduces the
results of the non–symmetric strategy.
This paper is organized as follows: first, we consider
general symmetric incoherent attacks; next, we consider
general symmetric 2-qubit coherent attacks; and finally,
we show that the symmetric strategies are sufficient to
study eavesdropping attacks.
Let us analyze first the incoherent attacks. Denoting
by |E〉 the initial state of Eve’s probe, the unitary oper-
ation U can be characterized by its action on a basis set
of Alice states
|E〉 ⊗ |0〉z U−→ |Ez0,0〉|0〉z + |Ez0,1〉|1〉z, (1a)
|E〉 ⊗ |1〉z U−→ |Ez1,0〉|0〉z + |Ez1,1〉|1〉z, (1b)
where |Ezi,j〉 are unnormalized states of Eve’s probe that
span a 4–dimensional Hilbert space. Equation (1) can be
written in a more compact form as
|E〉 ⊗
( |0〉z
|1〉z
)
U−→ Ez ⊗
( |0〉z
|1〉z
)
, (2)
where Ez is a 2×2 matrix whose elements are Eve’s states
|Ezi,j〉. The action of U on the basis {|0〉x, |1〉x} can be
readily derived using linearity
|E〉 ⊗
( |0〉x
|1〉x
)
U−→ Ex ⊗
( |0〉x
|1〉x
)
. (3)
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Here Ex = VEzV†, where
V = V† = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(4)
implements the transformation from the z to the x basis.
Let us now particularize the above equations for a sym-
metric attack. To this aim, we note that for a given
measurement strategyM, the scalar products 〈Ezi,j |Ezk,l〉
characterize the unitary operation U of Eve’s attack. In
the present context, a symmetric attack is defined by
imposing that all scalar products 〈Eαi,j |Eαk,l〉 (α = x, z,
i, j, k, l = 0, 1)) have to be invariant with respect to two
operations: (i) exchange of the states 0 ↔ 1; (ii) ex-
change of basis z ↔ x. This amounts to requiring that
all possible states sent by Alice (∈ S) are treated on an
equal footing. For example, the first condition (i) means
that the probability amplitudes of any outcome should
not depend on whether Alice prepared a |0〉 or a |1〉. It
imposes that the scalar products should be invariant un-
der the exchange of the subindices 0↔ 1, i.e.,
F = 〈E0,0|E0,0〉 = 〈E1,1|E1,1〉, (5a)
D = 〈E0,1|E0,1〉 = 〈E1,0|E1,0〉, (5b)
F1 = 〈E0,0|E1,1〉 = 〈E1,1|E0,0〉, (5c)
D1 = 〈E0,1|E1,0〉 = 〈E1,0|E0,1〉, (5d)
etc, where traditionally F is called fidelity and D dis-
turbance. The second condition (ii) means that the out-
comes should not depend on whether Alice used the z or
the x basis. Together with the normalization condition,
it imposes that
F +D = 1, F −D = F1 +D1, (6)
and that all the other scalar products that do not appear
in (5) have to be zero. Thus, the number of independent
parameters in the problem is reduced to only 2 real num-
bers (D and D1, for example). Fixing the disturbance
D, one can then determine any property of the attack
(information gain, probability of success in guessing the
qubit sent by Alice, etc) as a function of 1 parameter
only. Therefore, best strategies can be very easily (even
analytically) found by maximizing functions with respect
to one parameter.
With these notations one can rewrite Eqs. (1) in the
following appealing form:
|E〉 ⊗ |0〉z U−→
√
F |Eˆz0,0〉|0〉z +
√
D|Eˆz0,1〉|1〉z (7)
where |Eˆzj,k〉 represent Eve’s (normalized) state in case
Alice send a j bit and Bob detected a k bit. The fi-
delity F is the probability that Bob detected Alice bit
correctly, while the disturbance D is the complementary
probability of wrong detection.
Let us analyze now the measurement that allows Eve
to extract the maximal information out of her probe.
In principle, one should consider separately the cases in
which Alice prepares each of the states S, and then aver-
age over all these cases. However, thanks to the symme-
try, it is sufficient to consider only the situation in which
Alice chooses the z basis. In that case, after tracing over
Alice’s particle, Eve’s two possible states are:
ρE(0) = |Ez0,0〉〈Ez0,0|+ |Ez0,1〉〈Ez0,1|, (8a)
ρE(1) = |Ez1,1〉〈Ez1,1|+ |Ez1,0〉〈Ez1,0|, (8b)
The optimal measurement strategy M for Eve is based
on the fact that the four states that appear in the de-
composition of these two density matrices, |Ezi,j〉, fall
into two mutually orthogonal sets, S0 = {|Ez0,0〉, |Ez1,1〉}
and S1 = {|Ez0,1〉, |Ez1,0〉}, that can be therefore distin-
guished deterministically. The first set S0 occurs with
probability F , in which case Eve has to extract infor-
mation about two states with same a priori probability
and overlap cos(α) ≡ F1/F . The second set S1 occurs
with probability D and state overlap cos(β) ≡ D1/D [5].
Consequently, Eve’s information equals:
Ie = 1 + F H(Pα) +D H(Pβ), (9)
where H(P ) = P ln(P )+ (1−P ) ln(1−P ) is the Shanon
entropy, and Pα = [1 + sin(α)]/2. The probability that
Eve finds out the state sent by Alice is
Pe = F Pα +D Pβ . (10)
These two quantities Ie and Pe are maximum for α = β
(or, equivalently, F1/F = D1/D). In this case one has
D = [1 − cos(α)]/2, Iopte = 1 +H(Pα), and P opte = Pα.
These relations provide the explicit and analytic opti-
mum eavesdropping strategy with a single parameter α.
It agrees with the numerical result and the bound devised
in [6]. A complete presentation can be found in [7]. In
Fig. 1 (upper plot) we have plotted Iopte , Bob’s informa-
tion Ib, and I
opt
e +Ib as a function of D. In the lower plot
we represent P opte and Bob’s probability Pb = F . For dis-
turbances below 5%, as happens in experiments [8–10],
the information gain is proportional to the disturbance:
Ie ≈ 2 ln(2)D. In this case a simpler 2–dimensional probe
suffices [11]. On the other extreme, for α = π/3 the dis-
turbance is 14 and the optimal information gain is 0.6454
(0.579 for 2-dimensional probe).
Let us conclude the analysis of incoherent attacks
with the intriguing case when Bob’s information IB =
1 + H(D) (probability of success PB = 1 − D) equals
Eve’s optimum information Iopte (P
opt
e ). This occurs
when cos(α) = sin(α), i.e. when α = π/4. Remarkably
this coincides precisely with the threshold of violation of
the Bell-CHSH inequality [12] by Alice and Bob. Indeed,
the S parameter whose value is restricted below 2 by local
realism, S = 2
√
2 cos(α) = 2 for α = π/4. This proves
a conjecture presented in [11]. Another intriguing obser-
vation is that Iopte + Ib ≤ 1 (see Fig. 1); that is, the sum
of the informations gained by Eve and Bob does not add
to 1. This is due to the fact that Eve and Bob share an
entangled state, and perform only local measurements.
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Note however, that if Bob tells Eve the outcome of his
measurement, then Eve can guess with certainty what
was the qubit sent by Alice. In other words, if Bob and
Eve are allowed to communicate one with each other,
then, despite they do not perform joint measurements of
the entangled state, they can determine the state sent by
Alice.
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FIG. 1. Upper plot: Eve’s optimum information Iopte , Bob’s
information Ib, and I
opt
e + Ib (dashed line) as a function of the
disturbance D. Lower plot: Eve’s (Pe) and Bob’s (Pb) prob-
ability of obtaining the message sent by Alice as a function of
D.
We analyze now the possibility for Eve to interact
coherently
with two qubits sent by Alice. We consider that Alice
selects one of the 16 possible states among the set S =
{|0〉z|0〉z, |0〉z|1〉z, |1〉z|0〉z, |1〉z|1〉z, |0〉x|0〉z, |0〉x|1〉z, . . .}.
For convenience, we use binary notation: |0〉zx ≡
|0〉z|0〉x, |1〉xz ≡ |1〉x|0〉z, |2〉zz ≡ |0〉z|1〉z , |3〉xx ≡
|1〉x|1〉x, etc. Eve’s unitary operation is characterized
by the action of U on the basis zz
|E〉 ⊗


|0〉zz
|1〉zz
|2〉zz
|3〉zz

 U−→ Ezz ⊗


|0〉zz
|1〉zz
|2〉zz
|3〉zz

 , (11)
where E is a 4× 4 matrix containing Eve’s probe states,
i.e.,
U|E〉 ⊗ |i〉zz =
3∑
j=0
|Ezzi,j〉 ⊗ |j〉zz, (i = 0, . . . , 3). (12)
Taking into account the unitarity of U , this operation
is characterized by 240 real numbers (which are directly
related to the scalar products of the elements of Ezz).
By imposing the conditions of a symmetric attack, and
without loss of generality, the number of independent
parameters is reduced to only 5.
The symmetric attack imposes now three conditions
for the scalar products 〈Ezzi,j |Ezzk,l〉, which are analogous
to the ones corresponding to the incoherent attack. They
have to remain unchanged under: (i) the exchange |0〉 ↔
|1〉 in the first qubit or the second qubit (independently);
(ii) the exchange of the state of the first qubit by the state
of the second qubit; (iii) the change of the basis (i.e., zz
to xz or zx or xx). The first condition is equivalent
to demanding that the scalar products have to remain
unchanged if one exchanges all the subindices
1↔ 2 (13a)
The second condition implies invariance if one exchanges
simultaneously the subindices
0↔ 1 and 2↔ 3. (13b)
Once this is satisfied, the third condition amounts to
simply impose that 〈Ezzi,j |Ezzk,l〉 = 〈Exzi,j |Exzk,l〉, ∀i, j, k, l =
0, . . . , 3, where the matrix Exz = (V ⊗ 1)Ezz(V†⊗ 1), and
V is defined in (4) [13]. In more detail, let us define the
following parameters:
A = 〈Ezz0,0|Ezz0,0〉, A1 = 〈Ezz0,0|Ezz1,1〉, A2 = 〈Ezz0,0|Ezz3,3〉,
B = 〈Ezz0,1|Ezz0,1〉, B1 = 〈Ezz0,1|Ezz1,0〉,
B2 = 〈Ezz0,1|Ezz3,2〉, B3 = 〈Ezz0,1|Ezz2,3〉,
C = 〈Ezz0,3|Ezz0,3〉, C1 = 〈Ezz0,3|Ezz1,2〉, C2 = 〈Ezz0,3|Ezz3,0〉.
Imposing the symmetry and unitary conditions one finds
that: first, the scalar product 〈Ezzi,j |Ezzk,l〉 is zero if among
the indices (i, j, k, l) either three are identical and one is
different or two are idential and two different [14]; second,
each of the other scalar products are identical to one of
these parameters [15]; third, all these parameters are real
and fulfill the following relations [analogous to (6)]
A+ 2B + C = 1, B − C = B3 + C1,
A−B = A1 +B1, A1 −A2 = B2 +B3,
B1 − C2 = B2 + C1 (14)
In this way, Eve’s unitary transformation is fully charac-
terized by only 5 real parameters.
By virtue of the symmetry, to determine Eve’s distur-
bance we can consider the case in which Alice prepared
the state |0〉zz. One readily finds D = 1 − (A + B). To
determine Eve’s gain of information, we can restrict our-
selves to the case in which Alice used the zz basis to pre-
pare the states. The density matrices that Eve obtains
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for the 4 different choices of Alice qubits (|0〉zz, . . . , |3〉zz)
can be directly read off from the Eq. (12). Analogous to
the incoherent attack case, Eve has first to distinguish
among 4 orthogonal sets:
S0 = {|Ezz0,0〉, |Ezz1,1〉, |Ezz2,2〉, |Ezz3,3〉}, (15a)
S1 = {|Ezz0,1〉, |Ezz1,0〉, |Ezz2,3〉, |Ezz3,2〉}, (15b)
S2 = {|Ezz0,2〉, |Ezz2,0〉, |Ezz1,3〉, |Ezz3,1〉}, (15c)
S3 = {|Ezz0,3〉, |Ezz3,0〉, |Ezz1,2〉, |Ezz2,1〉}, (15d)
which occur with probabilities A, B, B, and C, respec-
tively. This distinction can be performed with certainty,
since the sets are mutually orthogonal. Then she has
to find out which element of the corresponding set she
has. To analyze that, note that in the case of S0 and
S3, the four vectors form a pyramid with square base
in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space [Fig. 2(a)], whereas
in the case of S1 and S2, they form a pyramid with
rectangular base [Fig. 2(b)]. For S0 and S3 there are
two different overlaps among the four vectors, namely
cos(θ01,2) = A1/A,A2/A, and cos(θ
3
1,2) = C1/C,C2/C,
respectively. For S1 and S2 there are three different over-
laps cos(θ11,2,3) = cos(θ
2
1,2,3) = B1/B,B2/B,B3/B. De-
noting by ~aji (i, j = 0, . . . , 3) the i–th vector of the j–th
set, we can then write the 4 vectors of any given set j in
terms of an orthonormal (cartesian) basis ~e0, . . . , ~e3 as


~aj0
~aj1
~aj2
~aj3

 =


a b c d
b a d c
c d a b
d c b a




~ej0
~ej1
~ej2
~ej3

 . (16)
The coefficients satisfy the following equations:
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 = 1, 2(ab+ cd) = cos(θj1), (17a)
2(ad+ bc) = cos(θj2) 2(ac+ bd) = cos(θ
j
3), (17b)
where we choose the solutions with a > b, c, d. Here, for
the sake of compactness we have defined θ0,33 = θ
0,3
1 . We
find that the best measurement corresponds to use the
cartesian basis. For example, if the result is ~e2, then take
as a guess the corresponding state ~a2.
θ1
θ1
θ1θ1
θ1θ1
θ2
θ2 θ2
θ2 θ3θ3
a1a2
a3
a0
a1
a0
a2
a3
(a) (b)
FIG. 2. Diagrammatic representation of the states of: (a)
sets S0 and S3; (b) sets S1 and S2.
For a given set of 5 independent parameters using the
relations (14) one first calculates the angles θ, as well as
the probabilities of ending up with a given set S. Then
one calculates the probabilities a2, b2, c2 and d2 for each
given set by solving Eqs. (17). Starting from these prob-
abilities, one can determine for a given disturbance D
the probability for Eve to find out what was the mes-
sage sent by Alice, as well as her information gain. We
have found analytically that the strategy that gives Eve
the maximum amount of information coincides with the
incoherent attack analyzed above (Fig. 1). In contrast,
the strategy that gives her maximum probability for de-
termining the full message (0, 1, 2, or 3) sent by Alice
is different, and indeed relies on the use of a coherent
attack.
If Fig. 3 we have plotted Eve’s and Bob’s probabilities
Pe and Pb for guessing the two qubits sent by Alice as
a function of the disturbance, both for the optimum in-
coherent attack P 1 as well as for the optimum coherent
attack P 2 (this last, calculated numerically with a max-
imization procedure). In the lower insert we have plot-
ted a detail of the curves around the disturbance which
corresponds to violation of Bell’s inequalities in the inco-
herent (single qubit) attack. In the upper insert we have
plotted the relative gain of probability that Eve and Bob
obtain using the coherent attack. This relative gain is
rather small (smaller than 1.5%). For Eve it occurs at
low disturbances, just where experiments take place.
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FIG. 3. Bob’s (Pb) and Eve’s (Pe) probabilities of guessing
the two qubits sent by Alice for incoherent (P1) and coherent
(P2) attacks. The inserts show a detail of the curves, as well as
the relative gain of the coherent attack.
Let us notice that Bob could detect coherent attacks
on successive pairs of qubit by controling the correlation
of failures of successive qubits. However, Eve can pre-
vent such a defense by attacking randomly chosen pairs
of qubits, though at the cost of extra practical complica-
tions.
Let us conclude by sketching the proof that for a gen-
eral case of coherent attack on n qubits (n ≥ 1), the
analysis of what we have defined as symmetric strategies
suffices. To do that we show that for any given strat-
egy {U ,M} one can always construct a symmetric one
{Us,Ms} that reproduces the results for all the prop-
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erties which are defined as averages over the set S of
possible states sent by Alice
Q =
1
22n
∑
|α〉∈S
Qα. (18)
For example if Q is the probability for Eve to guess the
result sent by Alice, then Qα would be this probability
provided Alice has prepared the state |α〉. Q could also
be Eve’s or Bob’s information gain, the disturbance, etc.
The action of U is given, in general, by
U|E〉 ⊗ |i〉z =
2n−1∑
j=0
|Ei,j〉 ⊗ |j〉z, (i = 0, . . . , 2n − 1),
(19)
i.e., it is characterized by a matrix E with the states of
Eve’s probe [as in (11)]. Let us denote by T one of the
operations (acting on Alice’s qubits) that we have used
to define the symmetric attack. To be more specific, we
take T to be an operation that: (1) Is idempotent
T 2 = 1; (20a)
(2) Leaves Alice set of states invariant
T S = S. (20b)
For example,the operation corresponding to exchanging
0↔ 1 in the q–th qubit (in the z basis) would be
T |0〉q = |1〉q, T |1〉q = |0〉q, (21)
whereas the one corresponding to exchanging the basis
z ↔ x would be T ≡ V defined in (4). Note that under
these operations, E becomes T ET .
We now construct explicitely a symmetric attack
{UT ,MT } with respect to T [16]: (i) The action of UT
is given by the matrix ET = 1√
2
(E|0〉e+T ET |1〉e), where
|0〉e and |1〉e are two orthogonal states of an extra ancilla
used by Eve and E|0〉e is the matrix whose elements are
the vectors obtained by applying the tensor product to
the elements of E and the vector |0〉e; (ii) Eve’s measure-
ment MT is defined as follows: first measure the state
of the ancilla; if the result is |0〉e, then use the origi-
nal measurement strategy M; if it is |1〉e, then use the
measurement strategyM that she would have applied if
Alice state was prepared in the state T |α〉 instead of |α〉.
For example, for T corresponding to the change of basis
z ↔ x, if Bob announces publically a measurement along
the z axis and Eve obtains |1〉e, then she should mea-
sure her probe as if Bob had announced a measurement
in the x basis. Using (20a) one can readily check that
{UT ,MT } fulfills 〈ETi,j |ETk,l〉 = 〈(T ET T )i,j |(T ET T )k,l〉,
i.e. it is symmetric with respect to T . On the other
hand, using (20b) one obtains that regardless of the re-
sult of the measurement on the ancilla, MT will give for
Q the same result as the one given by the non–symmetric
strategy (18). Using this procedure, one can then con-
struct an attack {Us,Ms} that is symmetric with respect
to all such operations T , which it is what we have called
a “symmetric eavesdropping strategy”.
In conclusion, an analytic derivation of the incoher-
ent eavesdropping strategy on the BB84 4 state quantum
cryptography protocol that maximizes Eve’s information
has been presented. Using coherent attacks, i.e. assum-
ing that Eve can interact coherently with more than one
of the qubits send by Alice, seems not to improve Eve’s
information gain. This was proven for the 2-qubit case
and we conjecture that this result hold for arbitrary co-
herent attacks. However, our analysis shows that coher-
ent attacks can improve the probability that Eve guesses
correctly the entire key, at the cost of higher probability
that Eve guess is wrong on each qubit. This provides
another example [3,?] that coherent (sometimes called
collective) measurements can provide results unachiev-
able with only incoherent measurements.
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